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Rule Against Perpetuities Applied to Trusts
By Frederick Vierling

Those familiar with the rules of law concerning the duration
of trust estates have learned that private trusts may not be
created for unlimited lengths of time. The rule of law controlling
the duration of private trusts is the rule known as “the rule
against perpetuities.” The law permits the establishment of
private trusts for only reasonable lengths of time, so as not per
manently to withdraw from commerce the realty and personalty
bequeathed in trust. The rule does not apply to charitable or
benevolent trusts, as such trusts may continue indefinitely or, in
contemplation of law, perpetually.
RULE LIMITING DURATION OF TRUSTS

Under the rule against perpetuities, private trusts may be
created for the life of the last survivor of any number of desig
nated persons, in being at the commencement of the trust, and
for periods of 21 years thereafter. If at the death of the survivor
there be any unborn beneficiary in gestation, additional time is
allowed for the birth of such posthumous beneficiary. The period
of gestation varies, and usually does not extend beyond nine or ten
months. If a trust be created by will, the time of commencement
of the trust is the date of death of testator. If a trust be created
by conveyance or transfer in trust, the time of commencement of
the trust is the execution and delivery of the instrument.
ORIGIN OF RULE

The rule against perpetuities, as applied to an accumulating
trust, was for the first time applied by the courts of England in
1799, in the famous case known as the Thellusson case, reported
in 4 Ves. Jr., 227. Up to that time, there was no case definitely
deciding for how long a time a trusteeship might be made to
continue. Thellusson died in 1797, leaving a will dated 1796.
After making provisions for his wife and a number of others, he
devised and bequeathed the residue of his estate in trust to
accumulate for the lives of his three sons and such of their issue
as should be living at the time of his death or born in due time
afterwards. He directed, on the death of the survivor of said
beneficiaries, that the estate should be divided in three parts and
conveyed and transferred to the then beneficiaries absolutely and
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free of trust. At the time of Thellusson’s death, he was survived
by 15 descendants, namely, his three sons and their issue. It
appeared that the estate would be tied up from alienation and
enjoyment for three generations.
DECISIONS DECLARING RULE

Suit was brought to have the Thellusson trust declared void,
on the ground that the period of time specified for the trust to
continue was too remote. It was urged that most attempts to
create perpetuities are made with a view to continuing the enjoy
ment of property for a long series of years in the families of the
testators; that Thellusson contrives how long it is possible to keep
any of his descendants from the enjoyment of his property; that
no one who had ever breathed the same air with Thellusson could
inherit; that he excludes three generations from all chance of
enjoyment; that Thellusson did not wish to continue the property
in his family, but to preclude his family and all mankind from
alienating and even enjoying his property during the longest
possible period; that, by carrying out Thellusson’s plan, only a
revenue equal to the civil list of England may, by no very remote
possibility, be centered in one family, with absolute command
over the capital. Prior to the hearing of the Thellusson case, the
courts of England held that the period of limitation of an executory
devise is “a life or lives in being and 21 years and a few months,”
to allow the birth of posthumous children; that, under such rule,
the vesting of an estate, given by way of an executory devise, is
restrained only during the life of one person, the survivor; that
restraint for such period does not tend to a perpetuity; that, if
any devisee be a minor, the law itself would restrain alienation
until the devisee became of age; that it was permissible, by way
of executory devise, to include posthumous children as devisees.
Having the precedent theretofore set with respect to an executory
devise, in deciding the Thellusson case the court concluded it
would follow such precedent and held that trusts may be created
for any terms certain to end within periods not exceeding periods
permitted for estates granted by way of executory devise.
LIMITATIONS AT COMMON LAW

Before the enactment in England in 1535 of the statute of uses
and in 1540 of the statute of wills, no questions of remoteness
connected with estates seem to have come before the English
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courts. In 1576, in case of Manning vs. Andrews, 1 Leon, 256,
the court indicated that if a devise be made to one for life, and
then to his heir for life, and so from heir to heir in perpetuam
for life, by use of special words, such devise would be good. The
effect of indefinite restraint in the alienation of property became
manifest, resulting in the passage of the statutes mentioned to
give relief.
EXECUTORY DEVISES

The foundation case, in establishing the period of limitations
permissible in the case of an executory devise, is the famous case
known as the Duke of Norfolk case, decided in England in 1685
and reported in 3 Ch. Cas. 1. In that case, the testator attempted
to keep his property in. his family and prevent alienation of the
estate for a period of two hundred years. It was urged in court
that a perpetuity is a thing odious in law and destructive of the
commonwealth; that it would put a stop to commerce and prevent
the circulation of the riches of the kingdom, and should not be
countenanced in equity; that if in equity one should come nearer
to a perpetuity than the rules of common law would admit, all
men, being desirous of continuing their estates in their families,
would settle their estates by way of trusts. Upon consideration
of the case, the court held that a future interest might be limited
to commence on a contingency which must occur within lives
in being, and thus was stated the basis of limiting estates by
executory devises.
The second important case, in the development of the rule
in question, is the case decided in England in 1736, Stephens vs.
Stephens, reported in 25 Reprint Eng. Cas. 751. In the Stephens
case it was held: (1) an executory devise to a child living at
testator’s death and on such child reaching majority was good;
(2) if a devise be given to a posthumous child, there could be no
alienation until he should attain the age of 21. It is now held,
that the term of 21 years need have no reference to the minority
of the devisee, nor indeed to any minority at all.
The third important case is the case decided in England in
1793, Taylor vs. Biddall, reported 2 Mod. Cas. 289. In that case
the court held, as the power of alienation will not be restrained
longer than the law restrains it, namely, during the infancy of
the first taker, the restraint cannot reasonably be said to extend
to a perpetuity.
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The principles announced in the three cases mentioned became
embodied in the rule against perpetuity, as applied to interests
created by way of executory devise. These principles were
adopted by the sages hearing the cases, who deemed that a
reasonable restraint against alienation of property should be
enforced, and, at the same time, had the wisdom to realize that
perpetual restraint would be unwise and would become a shackle
upon posterity. The principles have been repeatedly affirmed in
the courts of England and in the courts of our various states.
In a number of our states the period has been cut down by
statute and the rule as originally adopted does not now apply in
such states.
TWO MODERN CASES OF GENERAL INTEREST

The case of Cadell vs. Palmer, decided in England in 1832,
reported in 6 Reprint Eng. Cas. 956, is an interesting case bearing
on the rule against perpetuities. The will provided that the trust
should continue for one hundred and twenty years, if any of the
persons named should so long survive, otherwise until the death
of the last survivor, and then in trust for twenty additional years.
Of the persons during whose lives the trust was to continue,
there were twenty-eight persons living at the death of the testator,
of whom seven only were to take interests under the devise. The
trust was sustained.
The case of Madison vs. Larman, decided in Illinois in 1897,
reported in 170 Ill., 65, is an interesting American case. In that
case, the trust was for the life of the survivor of seventeen
persons living at the death of the testator. The trust was
sustained.
DUKE OF NORFOLK CASE

In the Duke of Norfolk case, as above mentioned, the testator
attempted to restrain the alienation of property for a period of
two hundred years. The testator did not attempt to create an
accumulating estate, as in the Thellusson case. The facts in the
Duke of Norfolk case may be utilized to demonstrate the menace
to posterity of permitting estates to accumulate for long periods
of time or indefinitely. The Duke of Norfolk case was decided
in 1685. Since that time 238 years have elapsed. Suppose the
testator had directed the accumulation of the estate to 1923, and
suppose his plan had been allowed to operate, the accumulation
would have been enormous. The value of the estate is not given
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in the above-mentioned report of the case, so figures of actual
value cannot now be used. Assuming a growth at a yearly rate
of increase equivalent to yearly interest of the decimal value of
.045, compounded annually, in 238 years the sum of $1 would
have accumulated to the amount of $35,454.96. On that basis, it
would have required a fund of only about $28,205.56 to accumu
late to $1,000,000,000 in the 238 years. A reading of the report
of the case gives one the impression that the estate was of con
siderable value, far in excess of $28,000.
THE THELLUSSON CASE

Benjamin Franklin died in 1790. Under codicil to his will he
bequeathed £1,000 to trustees in Boston, to be used for benevo
lent purposes. He directed the accumulation of the fund for
one hundred years, and the distribution at the end of that period
of about 76 per cent. of the then fund, and directed that the
remaining 24 per cent. be continued in trust for a second period
of one hundred years, the amount at the end of the second one
hundred years to be finally distributed. An examination of the
record of the Franklin fund shows it has grown at a yearly rate
of increase equal to yearly interest of the decimal value of
.044626, compounded annually.
Thellusson died seven years after Franklin. The records show
that Thellusson left real estate in England of an annual value
of £4,500, which it may reasonably be assumed had a capital
value of £90,000. The records also show that Thellusson left a
personal estate of the value of £600,000. The two amounts total
£690,000, on a gold parity basis being the equivalent in dollars
of the sum of $3,357,919. From the records of the Thellusson
case, it appears that it was estimated that the trust would continue
for not less than seventy years and might possibly continue for
one hundred and twenty-five years, or practically until the present
time. If the Thellusson trust had continued until the present
time, or one hundred and twenty-six years, and if the fund, the
equivalent of $3,357,919, had increased at a rate of growth equal
to the rate of growth of the Franklin fund accumulated in Boston
at practically the same time, to wit: at an interest rate equal to the
decimal value of .044626, compounded annually for one hundred
and twenty-six years, the fund would have increased to a total of
about $822,493,238. At that rate of growth, it would require
one hundred and eighty-four years for the principal of
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$3,357,919 to grow to $10,348,158,000, or to more than recent
estimates of the total amount of all gold and silver money in the
world.
Under the rule against perpetuities, as approved in the
Thellusson case the Thellusson estate might have been continued
in trust, after the death of the last survivor of the fifteen persons
mentioned, for the period of gestation of posthumous children, if
any, and 21 years. The full period of accumulation allowed under
the rule is indeed liberal.
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